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Abstract
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) based adversarial training has become one of the most promi-
nent methods for building robust deep neural network models. However, the computational complexity
associated with this approach, due to the maximization of the loss function when finding adversaries, is
a longstanding problem and may be prohibitive when using larger and more complex models. In this
paper, we propose a modification of the PGD method for adversarial training and demonstrate that
models can be trained much more efficiently without any loss in accuracy on natural and adversarial
samples. We argue that the initial phase of adversarial training is redundant and can be replaced with
natural training thereby increasing the computational efficiency significantly. We support our argument
with insights on the nature of the adversaries and their relative strength during the training process. We
show that our proposed method can reduce the training time to up to 38% of the original training time
with comparable model accuracy and generalization on various strengths of adversarial attacks.
1 Introduction
With the impressive performance of deep neural networks over multiple tasks, these models are being de-
ployed in a variety of domains including entertainment, finance, healthcare, safety and security. However, a
peculiar characteristic of these models is their extreme sensitivity to specially designed imperceptible small
perturbations to the input data, called Adversarial Samples. For example, it is possible to make an oth-
erwise highly accurate neural network classifier misclassify by adding a small imperceptible non-random
perturbation to a test image [20].
Out of the various approaches proposed to improve the robustness of deep neural network models, Adver-
sarial Training is found to be most effective [5, 20, 10, 23, 2, 6, 4]. In a typical adversarial training procedure
of the model, first adversarial versions of the training dataset are generated and are then used to train the
model to increase its robustness on such samples [5].
There are multiple methods to generate adversarial samples which are called the type of attack [5, 3, 17,
11, 10]. The general principle behind most of the attacks is to identify data points in the input space which
are imperceptibly close to the training data points but result in the highest loss function value. This results
in the following general formulation [2]
max
x˜
L(fθ(x˜), y) (1)
s.t. d(x, x˜) ≤  (2)
where L is the loss function between the output of a classifier fθ and the actual label y, d is a distance metric
between the original training sample x and the corresponding adversarial sample x˜ and  is a predetermined
threshold. Different attack methods are designed by choosing different techniques to maximize (1) and
different distance metrics in (2). The main motivation behind generating various types of attacks is that the
stronger the generated attack, the stronger the defense that can be developed by training the model against
the attack. Researchers have also used a blend of different types of attacks to improve the generalization of
the adversarially trained models [2].
In this work, we use one of the most prominent adversarial training frameworks proposed by Madry et al.
which incorporates a min-max optimization of the overall objective function with respect to adversarial
samples and model parameters. The resulting models trained through this framework are shown to be
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Table 1: Natural and adversarial training times in hours for CIFAR-10 image dataset classification. All
training runs are done for 155 epochs with two NVIDIA V100 GPUs, the same training hyperparameters
and the standard CIFAR-10 training dataset split. Adversarial training is done using 10-step projected
gradient descent adversaries with ball size 8/255 and step size 2/255.
Model
architecture
Natural
training
Regular
adversarial
training
ResNet-50 1.1 hours 6.8 hours
WideResNet-28x10 2.2 hours 14.7 hours
robust against strong PGD attacks [8], with MNIST [9] achieving about 90% accuracy on adversarial samples.
Although we have tested our approach with the framework proposed in [10], it is generic and can be applied
to other frameworks as well.
Adversarial training by Madry et al. aims to solve the following min-max robust optimization problem,
min
θ
ρ(θ); ρ(θ) = E(x,y)∼D
[
max
‖x˜−x‖∞≤
L(fθ(x˜), y)
]
, (3)
where fθ(.) is a deep neural network with parameters θ and x˜ is an -ball `∞ adversarial sample of natural
sample x having class label y. x˜ is generated using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [8] as explained below
in Equation (4). The true data comes from distribution D and L(·) is the loss function. The maximization
seeks to find an adversary which maximizes the loss and the minimization seeks to find the model parameters
that minimizes the loss due to the adversary. The minimization is solved via standard neural network
optimization techniques. The maximization is typically solved using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) for
gradient ascent,
xt+1 = Π
(
xt + α sign(∇xtL(fθ(xt), y))
)
, (4)
where α is the step size and Π(·) projects the result of the gradient step into the -ball around the original
sample, x. We say it is a T -step PGD attack if t + 1 = T . As the value of T increases, the adversaries
become stronger which results in a greater chance of misclassification by a trained model. We are required
to make T forward and backward passes of the deep neural network to complete the iterative procedure in
Equation (4). This is a significant computational overhead to the training process and can be prohibitive
for large models. This is especially relevant because one of the insights from Madry et al. is that models
with larger capacity are more robust. Furthermore, some adversarial defense strategies involve training an
ensemble of neural networks [21, 18, 12] and any per network training time reduction can scale quickly.
Table 1 confirms that the training time for adversarial training is significantly higher than natural training
when classifying the the CIFAR-10 image dataset [7] for two popular architectures. The same hardware,
training dataset, training hyperparameters and total number of epochs were used to obtain all timings. Due
to the popularity of adversarial training, we are motivated to focus on improving the computational cost
of the adversarial training framework proposed by Madry et al. for image classification tasks. Specifically,
we question the need to always perform the expensive maximization of Equation (4) in Equation (3). At
the same time we wish to maintain the classification accuracy on both natural and adversarial samples.
Although we focus on the adversarial training framework proposed in [10], our method and insights are not
restricted and can be extended for other variants and extensions of adversarial training [2, 3].
In general, because of the phenomenal drops in accuracy of deep neural networks on adversarial samples,
the research community has been mostly focused on improving the accuracy of these models and computa-
tional efficiency has taken a backseat or been left largely unaddressed. We believe that as model robustness
improves with these emerging methods, the computation complexity will become a crucial factor.
Our contribution We show that adversaries generated in the initial phase of adversarial training are
treated more or less like natural samples by the final model. This means they have minimal influence on the
learned model and in fact may even hurt the final accuracy. As a consequence of this finding, we demonstrate
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that using natural, and not adversarial samples, for the initial phase of training gives comparable model test
accuracy. We further show that this initial phase lasts for a specific number of epochs and therefore a fully
converged natural model cannot be taken as the initial phase. Importantly our proposed training method
significantly reduces the training time because the expensive maximization in (3) is not required for a large
fraction of the training epochs. We perform rigorous experiments with multiple state-of-the-art deep neural
network models and datasets to demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.
2 Related work
The problem of overfitting with regular adversarial training [10] has been pointed out by several recent works
including [2, 23, 14, 13]. Reduced generalization with adversarial training was attributed to training with
strong adversarial samples from the beginning [2, 23]. This has led to curriculum adversarial training [2] in
which the strength of adversaries (as measured by the number of PGD steps in Madry et al.) in a training
batch is gradually increased as training progresses. Wang et al. further explained that the number of steps
is not the right measure of adversary strength and they defined a new criterion by linking the strength of
adversarial samples to the convergence of the inner maximization in Equation 3 [23]. These works suggest
that using lower quality adversaries during the initial phases of training helps improve accuracy. However,
their focus is not computational efficiency and still requires adversaries to be computed in the initial phases.
Furthermore, it was pointed out in Schmidt et al. that generalization of adversarially robust classifiers
cannot be improved by algorithmic design alone as it is inherently tied to the complexity of underlying data
distribution [13].
While the majority of research so far has focused on improving adversarial robustness through designing
defenses, much less consideration is given to their computational requirements and scalability, both of which
are concerns during adversarial training of complex networks with big and realistic datasets. In an attempt
to extend adversarial training to large scale networks, a linearly scalable approach was developed [24]. In
Trame`r et al. adversarial training using ImageNet was done using ensembles of pre-trained neural networks
to generate adversarial samples, thereby cutting the computational cost of regular adversarial training [21].
Another approach makes use of gradient information from model updates to reduce the overhead of generating
adversarial samples [15]. Recently, adversarial training was accelerated by formulating it as a discrete-time
differential game [26].
The trade-offs between generalization and robustness are inherent [22, 19]. Lately, there has been work
suggesting that certain values of adversarial training hyperparameters may have unexpected benefits [4].
Using traditional approaches [1] adversarial training hyperparameters were tuned to achieve the right tradeoff
between robustness and accuracy. In particular, Duesterwald et al. optimized the fraction of adversarial
samples in a training batch (for Madry et al. this value is 1). The appeal of our approach lies in its simplicity
as its devoid of any (costly) hyperparameter optimization sub-step.
Switching from natural samples to adversarial samples can be interpreted as a transfer learning scenario.
The current literature considers the scenario where the model is adversarially trained on both the source and
target datasets to obtain better robustness [6]. Or where the model is adversarially trained on the source
dataset and naturally trained on the target dataset [16]. In these approaches, while training on the target
datasets may be fast because many epochs are not required, training the model on the source dataset is
costly. We do not consider scenarios where we have pretrained models—we must efficiently make a model
robust from the beginning.
3 Delayed adversarial training
3.1 Usefulness of adversaries from the initial epochs of regular adversarial train-
ing
In the adversarial training framework natural training samples are replaced by their adversarial counterparts
and used as training data from the start of training. Adversarial samples generated using (4) are dependent
on the evolving model parameters which are initially randomly initialized. Generally at initialization, the
model’s parameters are relatively far from their final values. Therefore the adversarial samples generated in
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the initial training iterations are quite different from the type of adversaries that the model will face towards
the end of training. This is because the initial adversarial samples would not maximize the adversarial loss
in (3) with the final model parameters. The initial adversarial non-maximizing samples are weak adversaries
for the final model and may not be useful for improving robustness. Yet generating them adds computational
overhead and they influence the model.
To investigate the usefulness of the initial adversarial samples we perform regular adversarial training on
a model and test the final model with adversaries that are generated from the model’s parameters at previous
epochs. We use CIFAR-10 and the test images come from the dataset’s standard train-test split which are
never seen during training. We use the WideResNet-28x10 architecture [25] and adversarial test samples are
generated using Equation (3) and (4) with T = 10,  = 8255 and α =
2
255 . This is a standard architecture and
set of adversarial sample hyperparameters for CIFAR-10 in the adversarial training literature [10, 6].
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Figure 1: Top: Accuracy of a fully adversarially trained WideResNet-28x10 model when tested with adver-
saries that are generated using the model’s parameters at previous epochs. The model is trained using the
CIFAR-10 dataset. The green and red lines show the final model’s test accuracy on natural and adversar-
ial samples. Training and test samples are generated using (3) and (4) with T = 10,  = 8255 and α =
2
255 .
Stochastic gradient descent is used and the drop is due to a learning rate decrease; Bottom: The training loss
(logarithmic scale on the right) when performing full natural training on WideResNet-28x10 with CIFAR-10
samples.
Figure 1 plots the classification accuracy when the model is tested against adversaries from previous
epochs. The green and red lines indicate the final natural and adversarial test accuracy of the models. We
can see that adversarial samples from the initial epochs are treated more or less like natural samples by
the final model. The adversaries become more potent as the model parameters start to approach their final
value and the model starts to stabilize. The sharp increase in the adversary strength corresponds to the
first learning rate drop. Hence, samples from the initial phase of training have limited impact on improving
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Figure 2: Natural and adversarial test accuracy during regular adversarial training and adversarial training
with different switches. CIFAR-10 images are classified using the WideResNet-28x10. Adversarial samples
with T = 10,  = 8255 and α =
2
255 are used. SGD learning rate drops are after epochs 100, 105 and 150.
robustness. In spite of this, the computationally expensive maximization (4) is performed to generate these
samples for training and these samples are allowed to influence the model parameters.
3.2 Delayed Adversarial Training: Initial training with natural samples
As adversarial samples are computationally expensive to generate and not useful in the initial phase of
training, we would like to replace them with other training samples until the model reaches some form of
stability. Natural samples are an obvious choice for this replacement as we also want the trained model to
perform as well as possible on these samples as well. Hence we explore the use of natural samples instead of
the adversarial samples during the initial phase of training.
Training on natural samples does not require the costly maximization in Equation (4) and therefore
significantly reduces the training time. Consequently the time taken to get the model to an initial stable
state, where adversarial samples start to become relevant, is reduced. Furthermore, the model is expected
to correctly classify natural samples, but they are never seen in regular adversarial training.
Now we investigate the issue of how to quantify the “initial phase” of training and determine a switch
point from training on natural samples to training on adversarial samples. In the lower part of Figure 1,
we plot the training loss of full natural training for the same WideResNet-28x10 architecture on CIFAR-10
as in the top figure. We see that the natural training loss flattens roughly at the same epoch at which the
strength of the adversaries previously trained become reasonable in the top figure. This is due to the fact
that at this point the model parameters have started to converge towards a local minimum. This motivates
us to use the training loss on natural samples as an indicator to determine when to switch to training on
adversarial samples. We will use this motivation to propose an algorithm for a modified version of the
adversarial training process later in this section.
Before coming up with an exact algorithm for switching, we explore our proposition with observations on
a set of experiments where we switched from natural training to adversarial training at various points. This
is shown in Figure 2. Here we trained the WideResNet-28x10 on the CIFAR-10 dataset. We performed the
initial phase of training with natural samples and then switched to adversarial samples generated using PGD
at various switching points. Training and test adversaries are generated using (3) and (4) with T = 10,  = 8255
and α = 2255 . The learning rate drops after epochs 100, 105 and 150. We show how the accuracy on the
natural and adversarial test sets varies during regular adversarial training and adversarial training with
different switching epochs.
Figure 2 provides evidence that performing the initial phase of the training is indeed a promising approach.
We see that except for continuing the training with natural samples for too long (switching after the learning
rate drops), we in fact get better performance than regular adversarial training. The training time is also
reduced significantly as computing the expensive maximization in Equation (4) is not required until after the
switch is made. Before switching, the adversarial accuracy is almost 0% because the model is not robust and
is undergoing natural training. Note, that the adversarial accuracy rises very quickly with all the switching
points as compared to the case of regular adversarial training where adversarial samples are used from the
very beginning (the blue curve). This confirms our intuition that introducing adversarial examples later
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Algorithm 1 Delayed Adversarial Training
Input: Switching hyperparameter S; J training examples {(xj , yj)}Jj=1; Number of epochs N ; Optimizer
and its parameters; PGD attack AT,,α with parameters T, , α (number of steps, ball size, step size)
Output: Model parameters, θ
1: Randomly initialize θ
2: for i = 0 to N − 1 do
3: for each minibatch (xb, yb) do
4: if i > S then
5: Replace xb with xb ← AT,,α(θ,xb, yb)
6: end if
7: // if condition replaces natural samples with adversarial samples after epoch S. S = 0 corresponds to
regular adversarial training.
8: Update θ with the optimizer using (xb, yb)
9: end for
10: end for
in the training process is much more efficient than using them from the very beginning. We provide more
evidence of this observation for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 classification with the ResNet-50 and ResNet-18
architectures in the Appendix.
Based on the above observation, we first provide a basic algorithm (Algorithm 1) for our modification
to the adversarial training method. We call it Delayed Adversarial Training (DAT). We introduce a new
hyperparameter for delayed adversarial training, i.e., the epoch after which training data should be switched
from natural samples to adversarial samples. We call this hyperparameter, the switching point, S. In
Algorithm 1, S must be chosen in advance. The value of this hyperprameter lies between 0 and the total
number of training epochs, N . For maximum computational saving, we would want to use natural samples
for as long as possible and hence S should be as close to N as possible. However, as we have seen in
Figure 2, switching too late affects the final accuracy (both on natural samples and on adversarial samples).
Specifically, we see this happening when the switch is after the learning rate drop, i.e., explicit actions to
promote convergence because this will prevent the model from adapting to the newly introduced adversarial
samples. Hence, a naive approach to train the model till full convergence and then switch to adversarial
samples is not feasible.
Now we provide a method to automatically determine the value of the hyperparameter, S. From Figure 2,
a quick recipe for deciding S is to choose an epoch after the test accuracy on natural samples flattens and
before any learning rate drops. Hence, we use the observation on the evolution of training loss from Figure
1 to come-up with a dynamic strategy to switch from natural training to adversarial training. Specifically,
we dynamically determine the value of S as the epoch number where the training loss begins to converge.
Convergence is determined if the training loss value at the current epoch is within D% of the running average
of training losses over the previous W epochs. We depict Delayed Adversarial Training with this switching
strategy in Algorithm 2.
It is easy to note that even though we have based our motivation and experimentation on the min-max
approach from [10], our proposed modification to the regular adversarial training can be easily extended to
other frameworks which use different type of attacks in their training process.
3.3 Delayed Adversarial Training helps generalization
From Figure 3 we see that with delayed adversarial training, the natural test accuracy is often better as
compared to regular adversarial training. Also, there is a larger adversarial accuracy jump after the learning
rate reduction at epoch 100 which is indicative of better generalization. This happens because in the case of
delayed adversarial training, the model is not overfitting to adversaries of little relevance in the initial phase
of training (see Figure 1). Instead it is learning to classify natural samples which we always desire to be
correctly classified.
We can further confirm that our method helps generalization by looking at the training loss and adver-
sarial test accuracy for regular adversarial training and delayed adversarial training. Figure 3 shows how
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Algorithm 2 Delayed Adversarial Training with Automated Switching
Input: Length of training loss window to consider W ; Training loss deviation D from average window loss;
J training examples {(xj , yj)}Jj=1; Number of epochs N ; Optimizer and its parameters; PGD attack,
AT,,α, with parameters T, , α (number of steps, ball size, step size)
Output: Model parameters, θ
1: Randomly initialize θ
2: S ← N // initialize switch
3: for i = 0 to N − 1 do
4: for each minibatch (xb, yb) do
5: if i > S then
6: Replace xb with xb ← AT,,α(θ,xb, yb)
7: end if
8: // if condition replaces natural samples with adversarial samples after epoch S.
9: Update θ with optimizer and using (xb, yb)
10: end for
11: if S == N then
12: Calculate epoch’s training loss Li
13: if Li is within D% of the average of {Li−W , . . . , Li−2, Li−1} then
14: S ← i
15: end if
16: end if
17: end for
these values evolve during the course of training. In the case of delayed adversarial training (red dotted
curve), the training loss is low until the switch, because the training has only been done on natural samples.
This shoots up almost vertically at the time of switch to adversarial samples and then comes down gradually
as the model get trained on adversarial samples. The learning rate drop at epoch 100 causes the training
loss of both methods to drop significantly. As is evident from the figure, delayed adversarial training has
higher training loss and higher test accuracy which indicates better generalization as compared to regular
adversarial training.
Note that Cai et al. also demonstrated overfitting on adversarial samples with regular adversarial training.
They show adversarial accuracy begins to drop during regular adversarial training. We also demonstrate this
with ResNet-18 in Appendix A.2. We see the adversarial accuracy begins to drop during regular adversarial
training. However, this drop is reduced with for delayed adversarial training.
4 Experiments
In this section we evaluate our proposed method for efficiently training robust deep neural network models.
We compare the training time and test accuracy of the models trained using the proposed method against
regular adversarial training [10]. All adversarial perturbations are `∞ perturbations. We use the standard
CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and MNIST datasets in our evaluation.
For CIFAR-10, we use the WideResNet-28x10, ResNet-50 and ResNet-18 architectures with a batch size
of 128. With CIFAR-100, we use ResNet-50 and ResNet-18 with a batch size of 128. For MNIST we use a
model with two convolutional layers, which have 32 and 64 filters, followed by a fully connected layer of size
1024. Each convolutional layer is followed by a ReLU and 2 × 2 max pooling. The batch size for MNIST
experiments is 50.
SGD with momentum 0.9 and weight decay 2× 10−4 is used to train the WideResNet-28x10 and all the
ResNets for CIFAR. The initial learning rate for the WideResNet-28x10 is 0.1 and it is reduced by a factor
of ten after epochs 100, 105 and 150 and the model is trained for a total of 155 epochs. The ResNets also
have an initial learning rate of 0.1 which is reduced by a factor of ten after epochs 100 and 150 and the
model is trained for a total of 155 epochs. Adam with an initial learning rate of 1×10−4 is used for MNIST.
The Adam optimizer state and learning rate is reinitialized after switching. MNIST is trained for 80 epochs.
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Figure 3: Adversarial test accuracy and training loss evolution for the WideResNet-28x10 for CIFAR-10.
We show regular adversarial training (RAT) and delayed adversarial training (DAT). The left axis gives the
accuracy and right axis gives the training loss. Solid lines are accuracy curves and dashed lines are training
loss curves.
W and D parameters from Algorithm 2 are empirically tuned.
We parameterize PGD adversaries as {T, , α} where T is the number of PGD steps,  is the maximum
`∞ perturbation and α is the gradient ascent step size (see Equation (4)). For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
all adversarial samples used during training are of strength
{
10, 8255 ,
2
255
}
. MNIST adversarial samples for
training are generated with {40, 0.3, 0.01}. All PGD adversaries are constructed by adding an initial random
perturbation, δ, where ‖δ‖∞ ≤ .
CIFAR experiments are performed on a system with two NVIDIA V100 GPUs, 42 CPU cores and 48GB
memory. For MNIST experiments we use a system with one NVIDIA V100 GPU, 26 CPU cores and 24GB
memory.
We also have an early stopping criteria for the CIFAR-10 models to regularize and avoid training the
models for too long without much gain in accuracy. In this case, we stop training after the first learning rate
drop once the test loss on the natural samples of the current epoch is within 5% of the average test loss of
the previous five epochs.
In this section, we mainly present a comparison of training times and the performance of the trained
models against attacks of different strengths to the strength of the adversaries that were used in training.
The appendix contains additional plots and results for the different models and datasets which we used in
our experiments.
4.1 Training times
Table 2 shows the training times for all the models and datasets. We compare the time taken for regular
adversarial training and our method. The timings for the early stopping of CIFAR-10 models are also shown.
Note that MNIST experiments are done on a less powerful system than the CIFAR experiments.
The training times are significantly reduced using our method with often better accuracy. The importance
of our method is particularly felt when training large models such as the WideResNet-28x10 on the more
complex CIFAR-10 dataset. In this case we get 46.9% reduction in training time. With regularization via
early stopping, we get 62.4% savings in training time with this model and dataset. On all other dataset
and models also we get significant reduction in training time with accuracies very close to that of the
regular adversarial training. In fact, our robustness accuracy is mostly higher as compared to that of regular
adversarial training due to better generalization on adversarial samples as discussed in Section 3.
4.2 Generalization to other attacks
We evaluate the robustness of our models to attacks of strengths which they were not trained to resist.
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the performance with regular adversarial training and our method for the CIFAR-10
models (Figure 15 in Appendix A.2 shows the robustness for CIFAR-100 with ResNet-18). Figure 7 shows
it for MNIST. The models trained using our method are comparably robust against the wide variety of
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Table 2: Training time and test accuracy with natural samples and adversaries of same strength as train-
ing adversaries for Regular adversarial training (RAT) and Delayed Adversarial Training (DAT). MNIST
experiments are done on a less powerful system.
CIFAR-10
Training time Time saved Natural T = 10,  = 8/255
WideResNet-28x10
RAT 14.7 hours
46.9%
86.8% 48.5%
DAT 7.8 hours 87.9% 49.7%
RAT early stop 10.9 hours
62.4%
87.1% 49.2%
DAT early stop 4.1 hours 87.9% 53.6%
ResNet-50
RAT 6.8 hours
45.6%
75.2% 41.0%
DAT 3.7 hours 74.4% 41.1%
RAT early stop 5.0 hours
64.0%
73.2% 42.3%
DAT early stop 1.8 hours 72.2% 41.6%
ResNet-18
RAT 2.5 hours
36.0%
73.8% 37.0%
DAT 1.6 hours 72.8% 40.4%
RAT early stop 1.9 hours
52.6%
71.0% 40.6%
DAT early stop 0.9 hours 69.9% 41.1%
CIFAR-100
Training time Time saved Natural T = 10,  = 8/255
ResNet-50
RAT 6.9 hours
42.0%
44.2% 15.2%
DAT 4.0 hours 46.6% 15.2%
Resnet-18
RAT 2.6 hours
46.2%
44.7% 14.2%
DAT 1.4 hours 46.7% 14.2%
MNIST
Training time Time saved Natural T = 40,  = 0.3
Two-layer CNN
RAT 2.2 hours
13.6 %
98.2% 91.4%
DAT 1.9 hours 98.2% 91.9%
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Table 3: Robustness of models against adversaries with strengths that they were not trained to be robust
against when using Regular Adversarial Training (RAT) and Delayed Adversarial Training (DAT).
CIFAR-10
T = 20,
 = 8/255
T = 100,
 = 8/255
T = 10,
 = 4/255
T = 10,
 = 12/255
WideResNet-28x10
RAT 46.8% 46.5% 69.1% 35.7%
DAT 47.9% 47.4% 71.1% 35.5%
RAT early stop 47.8% 47.4% 70.0% 35.5%
DAT early stop 51.9% 51.2% 73.0% 37.7%
ResNet-50
RAT 39.7% 39.4% 58.8% 28.1%
DAT 40.0% 39.9% 58.5% 28.0%
RAT early stop 41.7% 41.4% 58.6% 29.9%
DAT early stop 40.7% 40.5% 57.1% 28.7%
ResNet-18
RAT 35.4% 35.0% 55.4% 24.9%
DAT 39.1% 38.8% 57.3% 27.4%
RAT early stop 39.9% 39.6% 56.9% 28.6%
DAT early stop 40.2% 39.9% 56.4% 28.9%
CIFAR-100
T = 20,
 = 8/255
T = 100,
 = 8/255
T = 10,
 = 4/255
T = 10,
 = 12/255
ResNet-50
RAT 14.6% 14.2% 25.7% 9.8%
DAT 14.5% 14.3% 26.4% 9.5%
ResNet-18
RAT 13.6% 13.1% 25.3% 8.7%
DAT 13.5% 13.1% 26.4% 8.7%
MNIST
T = 100,
 = 0.3
T = 1000,
 = 0.3
T = 40,
 = 0.33
T = 40,
 = 0.36
Two-layer CNN
RAT 89.2% 89.0% 64.5% 13.4%
DAT 89.6% 89.6% 85.6% 62.2%
attacks. Table 3 summarizes the differences between regular adversarial training and our method for typical
benchmark adversaries.
We note from Table 3 that increasing the model capacity results in improved robustness for all datasets
which is consistent with the observations made by Madry et al.. Also, consistent with Madry et al. is the
sharp fall in MNIST robustness when tested with  larger than what the model was trained for ( = 0.3).
To that end, our method delays the collapse in robustness as we can see from Figure 7.
4.3 Comparison to normal accelerated training
One could think of an alternate approach to reducing the time of adversarial training by accelerating the
learning rate drops and finishing the training process in a relatively smaller number of epochs. In order to
show that our proposed method is complementary to this alternate approach, we conduct an experiment
where the total number of training epochs, epochs at which learning rates drops take place and the switching
hyperparameter S, are approximately halved. Figure 8 shows the natural and adversarial test accuracy
evolution during training for this accelerated training procedure for CIFAR-10 with the WideResNet-28x10
model.
The measured training times for the regular adversarial training and our proposed delayed adversarial
training for this experiments are 9.5 hours and 6.8 hours respectively, i.e., 28% saving. Further, as we see
from the figure that this experiment gives us almost 2% improvement in adversarial accuracy over regular
adversarial training. Figure 9 further shows the performance of the models trained with accelerated training
against attacks of different strengths. Here there is slight reduction in overall performance of the models
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Figure 4: Accuracy of fully trained WideResNet-28x10 with CIFAR-10 when tested with attacks of different
strength. Adversaries used during training were of strength
{
10, 8255 ,
2
255
}
.
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Figure 5: Accuracy of fully trained ResNet-50 with CIFAR-10 when tested with attacks of different strength.
Adversaries used during training were of strength
{
10, 8255 ,
2
255
}
.
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Figure 6: Accuracy of fully trained ResNet-18 with CIFAR-10 when tested with attacks of different strength.
Adversaries used during training were of strength
{
10, 8255 ,
2
255
}
.
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Figure 7: Accuracy of fully trained two-layer CNN with MNIST when tested with attacks of different
strength. Adversaries used during training were of strength {40, 0.3, 0.01}.
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Figure 8: Natural and adversarial test accuracy during regular adversarial training and delayed adversarial
training when the training process is accelerated. CIFAR-10 images are classified using the WideResNet-
28x10. Adversarial samples with T = 10,  = 8255 and α =
2
255 are used.
at higher values of . However, when only comparing accelerated models, the performance of the models
trained with our proposed method is comparable to the model trained with regular adversarial training.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the computational efficiency of one of the most prominent adversarial training
frameworks to improve the robustness of deep neural networks. We presented insights about the usefulness of
training with adversarial samples in the initial and later phases of regular adversarial training and proposed
a modified version of the training framework which significantly improves its computational requirement.
We further show through various experiments that the neural network models trained through the proposed
framework are as accurate or better as the ones trained through the earlier framework and generalize quite
well to adversarial attacks of various strengths.
In the future, we plan to adapt our general method to other adversarial training frameworks. Furthermore,
although our goal is to improve training time, we get better accuracy in many cases. Future work aims to
explore this further in order to develop a methodology which considers accuracy and computational efficiency
in a more integrated way.
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Figure 9: Accuracy of fully trained WideResNet-28x10 with CIFAR-10 when training is accelerated and
tested with attacks of different strength. Adversaries used during training were of strength
{
10, 8255 ,
2
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A Additional results
A.1 Additional ResNet-50 results
Figure 10 shows the test accuracy of the ResNet-50 when tested against adversaries generated using the
model’s parameters from previous epochs. The accuracy drops correspond to epochs where stochastic gra-
dient descent learning drops happen. Consistent with Figure 1, we see that adversarial samples from the
initial epochs are treated more or less like natural samples by the final model. The adversaries become
more potent as the model parameters start to approach their final value and the model starts to stabilize.
Samples from the initial phase of training have limited impact on improving robustness. In spite of this, the
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Figure 10: Accuracy of a fully adversarially trained ResNet-50 model when tested with adversaries that
are generated using the model’s parameters at previous epochs. The model is trained using the CIFAR-10
dataset. The green and red lines show the final model’s test accuracy on natural and adversarial samples.
CIFAR-10 training and test samples are generated using (3) and (4) with T = 10,  = 8255 and α =
2
255 .
Stochastic gradient descent is used and the drops are due to learning rate decreases.
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Figure 11: Natural and adversarial test accuracy during regular adversarial training and adversarial training
with different switches. CIFAR-10 images are classified using the ResNet-50. Adversarial samples with
T = 10,  = 8255 and α =
2
255 are used. SGD learning rate drops are after epochs 100 and 150.
computationally expensive maximization (4) is performed to generate these samples for training and these
samples are allowed to influence the model parameters.
Similar to Figure 2, Figures 11 and 12 show the natural and adversarial accuracy during training when
different switches are used. The plots are for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 respectively.
A.2 Additional ResNet-18 results
Figures 13 and 14 show the natural and adversarial accuracy during training when different switches are
used. Again we use the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets.
Figure 15 shows the robustness of ResNet-18 when trained on CIFAR-10 against adversaries which they
were not trained to be robust against. Adversaries used during training were of strength
{
10, 8255 ,
2
255
}
.
A.3 Additional MNIST results
Similar to Figure 2, Figures 16 shows the natural and adversarial accuracy during training when different
switches are used. The plots are for MNIST with a two-layer CNN.
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Figure 12: Natural and adversarial test accuracy during regular adversarial training and adversarial training
with different switches. CIFAR-100 images are classified using the ResNet-50. Adversarial samples with
T = 10,  = 8255 and α =
2
255 are used. SGD learning rate drops are after epochs 100 and 150.
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Figure 13: Natural and adversarial test accuracy during regular adversarial training and adversarial training
with different switches. CIFAR-10 images are classified using the ResNet-18. Adversarial samples with
T = 10,  = 8255 and α =
2
255 are used. SGD learning rate drops are after epochs 100 and 150.
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Figure 14: Natural and adversarial test accuracy during regular adversarial training and adversarial training
with different switches. CIFAR-100 images are classified using the ResNet-18. Adversarial samples with
T = 10,  = 8255 and α =
2
255 are used. SGD learning rate drops are after epochs 100 and 150.
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Figure 15: Accuracy of fully trained ResNet-18 with CIFAR-100 when tested with attacks of different
strength. Adversaries used during training were of strength
{
10, 8255 ,
2
255
}
.
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Figure 16: Natural and adversarial test accuracy during regular adversarial training and adversarial training
with different switches. MNIST images are classified using two-layer CNNs. Adversarial samples with
T = 40,  = 0.3 and α = 0.01 are used.
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Figure 17: WideResNet-28x10 with CIFAR-10 initialized with different initial seeds. The natural and ad-
versarial accuracy with and without switching is shown.
A.4 Different seeds with WideResNet-28x10
Figure 17 shows that the same conclusions can be made with different model parameter initialization seeds.
The figure shows the WideResNet-28x10 being used for CIFAR-10 classification. The natural and test
accuracy like in Figure 2 is plotted for different initialization seeds. The performance is similar across
different seeds. Accuracy with and without switching is shown.
18
